UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/635
1 June 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 27 MAY 1994 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF AZERBAIJAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On behalf of Mr. Hassan A. Hassanov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijani Republic, I have the honour to inform you of the following.

On 20 May 1994 Azerbaijan signed an Agreement for the Strengthening of the Cease-fire Regime, drawn up by Mr. Y. Eliasson, Chairman of the Minsk Group (see annex).

Azerbaijan, devoted to the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes, is in fact demonstrating its firm intention to settle the conflict with Armenia by peaceful means on the basis of the well-known resolutions of the Security Council.

The Armenian side thus far has not consented to sign that document, in spite of the many statements of its representatives concerning Armenia's devotion to the cause of establishing peace.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annexes circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Yashar T. ALIYEV
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

94-23611 (E) 010694 010694 02/06/94

Annex

Agreement on the Strengthening of the Cease-fire Regime

As a result of the mediation efforts of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and of the Russian Federation with a view to the early cessation of the armed conflict, an Agreement on the Strengthening of the Cease-fire Regime, agreed upon by the representatives of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Nagorny Karabakh, has been arrived at and entered into force on 12 May 1994.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is requested to deploy without delay an observer mission for the maintenance of the cease-fire regime (see appendix).

The Commonwealth of Independent States and the Russian Federation are requested to take part, together with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, in carrying out the observation.

It is expected that the negotiations concerning an agreement on the cessation on the armed conflict and the elimination of its consequences will be completed by 29 May 1994, with a view to ensuring the irreversibility of the peace process and implementing Security Council resolutions 822 (1993), 853 (1993), 874 (1993) and 884 (1993).

In the event of violation of the cease-fire regime, the direct violators and their immediate superiors shall immediately be called to account by their commands.

This Agreement shall enter into force 24 hours after its signature.

For Azerbaijan:

(Signed) A. DJALILOV

(Signed) N. SALYKHOV

For Armenia:

For Nagorny Karabakh:

(Signed) A. GUKASIAN

Appendix

Plan for deploying the observer mission of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Not later than three days after the entry into force of this Agreement, a group of 34 observers of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) shall arrive in the area with a view to maintaining the cease-fire regime and verifying its implementation.

Provision is made for the immediate establishment of a Joint Coordinating Commission (JCC) headed by the leader of the CSCE mission and including representatives of the parties. The JCC shall work out the machinery for the disengagement of forces on the basis of the concept of reducing troop concentrations and deactivating heavy armaments.

Not later than 14 days after the entry into force of this Agreement, the total number of CSCE observers in the area shall be increased to 66 persons. They shall carry out the functions of maintaining the cease-fire regime and verifying its implementation, monitoring the disengagement of forces and the deactivation of heavy armaments and also other tasks entrusted to them by the JCC, including assistance in mine-clearing.

This shall be followed by the carrying out of the subsequent phases of the rapid deployment of the observer mission. All observers shall carry out their functions in accordance with their mandate on the basis of the "mandate of the observer mission" of 1 March 1993, agreed upon by the Minsk Group of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Provision is also made for the conduct of observations by the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Russian Federation.

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/636
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ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 31 MAY 1994 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF AZERBAIJAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a letter dated 30 May 1994 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, Mr. Hassan A. Hassanov, addressed to you (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yashar T. ALIYEV
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex

[Original: Russian]

Letter dated 30 May 1994 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan addressed to the President of the Security Council

On 27 May 1994, units of the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia, forcing their way across the State frontier of the Azerbaijani Republic, suddenly attacked Azerbaijani army posts close to the village of Gyunnut, in the Sharur district of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic.

The attack by the Armenian units was supported by artillery and armoured vehicles. As a result of this predatory incursion, four Azerbaijani servicemen were killed and three wounded. Two soldiers of the Azerbaijani army were taken hostage and carried off into Armenian territory, where, after being savagely tortured, they were murdered.

This latest villainous attack by armed forces of the Republic of Armenia was carried out hundreds of kilometres away from the Nagorny Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic at a time when the Azerbaijani side is observing the cease-fire agreement and when consultations are under way within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe with the aim of working out mutually acceptable means of reaching a political settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

The aggressive, unprovoked attack by armed forces of the Republic of Armenia and the bestial killing of the Azerbaijani service personnel and hostages constitute a flagrant violation of the universally accepted norms of international law and of the 1949 Geneva Conventions concerning the protection of victims of armed conflicts. It is a cynical challenge to world public opinion.

We appeal to the United Nations, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and other authoritative international organizations to condemn this most recent piratical attack by armed forces of the Republic of Armenia and to take effective measures to halt the aggression of the Republic of Armenia against the Azerbaijani Republic.

(Signed) H. HASSANOV

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/637
31 May 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 31 MAY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ANGOLA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit to you a letter dated 30 May 1994 from Mr. Venancio de Moura, Minister for External Relations of Angola and request that it be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Afonso VAN-DUNEM "MBINDA"
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 30 May 1994 from the Minister for External Relations of Angola addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to submit, for your knowledge and for the purposes you may deem pertinent, a copy of a letter of today's date that I addressed to the Secretary-General (see enclosure 1).

I note that the draft resolution on Angola being circulated among the members of the Security Council (S/1994/628) contains, in its paragraph 4, references that do not reflect the actual position of the Angolan Government. As a matter of fact, the President of the Republic carried out in the last days vast and complex consultations in order to obtain a consensus of the various segments of Angolan public opinion.

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General was informed of this fact, which allowed us to respond positively to the letter of President Bill Clinton, who supported the suggestions of the mediation and the troika of observers. The list, which I annex (see enclosure 2), is our last offer to the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) concerning the central and local administration of the Angolan State. We hope that UNITA responds without further ambiguities and the international community has the capability to appreciate this flexibility on the part of the Government as proof of good faith and a major contribution towards peace and national reconciliation.

As you may find out, the Government is doing its utmost to facilitate the rapid conclusion of an agreement that brings about a just and lasting peace. These efforts cannot be confounded by the UNITA of Mr. Savimbi, whose posture at the negotiating table is to create obstacles to the understanding intended in Lusaka.

(Signed) Venancio DE MOURA
Minister for External Relations

Enclosure 1

Letter dated 30 May 1994 from the Minister for External Relations of Angola addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that, as far as the proposal of the mediation regarding the enlargement of UNITA's participation in the central, provincial and local governments is concerned, H.E. Jose Eduardo Dos Santos, President of the Republic of Angola, has recently finished a round of consultations with the most important sectors of Angolan public opinion in order to obtain a minimum consensual base that permits the Government to take a decision in a stable political environment.

In this regard, instructions were given to the government delegation in Lusaka on 25 May 1994 in order to initiate consultations with your Special Representative and the observers in order to make some adjustments to the suggestions and give a positive response. I hope that this position of the Angolan Government merits the appreciation of the international community and of the members of the Security Council in particular, and serves as well as a contribution for exerting strong pressure on Mr. Savimbi in order to stop the war.

I enclose for your attention the list of our last offers regarding the participation of UNITA in the central and local administration of the Angolan State.

We want to achieve a just and lasting peace as quickly as possible so that the Angolan people stop suffering and we hope that UNITA answers in the same way and does not bring ambiguities to hamper the possibility for a rapid understanding that brings about a global cease-fire and peace for the country.

However, I submit to you that UNITA in the last days has intensified its attacks against Kuito/Bie, attacks that have already caused hundreds of dead among the civilian population. The attacks against the aircraft of the World Food Programme that transport humanitarian aid to meet the population's needs merits, on the side of the Security Council, vigorous condemnation. The Government continues to be flexible and tolerant in order to facilitate the negotiations and not to sharpen the contradictions and the lack of understanding that endanger the perspectives for a true democratic, multiparty, pacific and reconciled Angola, but will not neglect its responsibility regarding the rights of the Constitution and defence of territorial integrity, order and the law established in the country.

(Signed) Venancio DE MOURA
Minister of External Relations

Enclosure 2

Offer of the Government of Angola related to UNITA's participation in the central and local administration of the Angolan State

I. POSTS IN THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION

A. Ministers

1. Minister of Geology and Mines
2. Minister of Trade and Commerce
3. Minister of Health
4. Minister of Tourism and Hotel Industry

B. Vice-Ministers

1. Deputy Minister of Defence
2. Deputy Minister of Interior
3. Deputy Minister of Finance
4. Deputy Minister of Agriculture
5. Deputy Minister of Public Works
6. Deputy Minister of Social Affairs
7. Deputy Minister of Social Media

C. Ambassadors

1. Ambassador to Canada
2. Ambassador to Mexico
3. Ambassador to India
4. Ambassador to Cape Verde
5. Ambassador to Poland
6. Ambassador to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

II. POSTS IN THE PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION

A. Provincial governors

1. Governor of Uige
2. Governor of Lunda Sul
3. Governor of Kuando Kubango

B. Deputy provincial governors

1. Deputy Governor of Luanda
2. Deputy Governor of Bengo
3. Deputy Governor of Kwanza Sul

4. Deputy Governor of Benguela
5. Deputy Governor of Huambo
6. Deputy Governor of Bie
7. Deputy Governor of Huila

III. POSTS IN THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATION

A. Municipality administrators

1. Administrator of Caimbambo
2. Administrator of Camacupa
3. Administrator of Gonguembo
4. Administrator of Cassongue
5. Administrator of Curoca
6. Administrator of Huambo
7. Administrator of Ecunha
8. Administrator of Gambos
9. Administrator of Lubalo
10. Administrator of Luquembo
11. Administrator of Leua
12. Administrator of Camucuio
13. Administrator of Mucaba
14. Administrator of Quitexe
15. Administrator of Catabola
16. Administrator of Chitembo
17. Administrator of Cuimba
18. Administrator of Luchazes
19. Administrator of Zala
20. Administrator of Bembe

Note. Ten municipality administrators to be indicated later on by the Government.

B. Deputy municipality administrators

1. Deputy Administrator of Dande
2. Deputy Administrator of Baia Farta
3. Deputy Administrator of Buco Zau
4. Deputy Administrator of Mavinga
5. Deputy Administrator of Samba Caju
6. Deputy Administrator of Golungo Alto
7. Deputy Administrator of Conda
8. Deputy Administrator of Cahama
9. Deputy Administrator of Bailundo
10. Deputy Administrator of Catchiungo
11. Deputy Administrator of Caconda
12. Deputy Administrator of Viana
13. Deputy Administrator of Rangel
14. Deputy Administrator of Cazenga
15. Deputy Administrator of Cuilo

16. Deputy Administrator of Cangandala
17. Deputy Administrator of Caombo
18. Deputy Administrator of Alto Zambeze
19. Deputy Administrator of Namibe
20. Deputy Administrator of Macocola
21. Deputy Administrator of Uige
22. Deputy Administrator of Tomboco
23. Deputy Administrator of Calai
24. Deputy Administrator of Chongoroi
25. Deputy Administrator of Cuchi

Note. Ten deputy municipality administrators to be indicated later on by the Government.

C. Commune administrators

1. Administrator of Demba Chio
2. Administrator of Tabi
3. Administrator of Chila
4. Administrator of Chingongo
5. Administrator of Chicuma
6. Administrator of Cambandua
7. Administrator of Caivera
8. Administrator of Caieie
9. Administrator of Soma Kwanza
10. Administrator of Longa
11. Administrator of Lupire
12. Administrator of Savate
13. Administrator of Maue
14. Administrator of Quiquiemba
15. Administrator of Sanga
16. Administrator of Pambangala
17. Administrator of Kissange
18. Administrator of Quenha
19. Administrator of Botera
20. Administrator of Mucope
21. Administrator of Calima
22. Administrator of N'Gombeialamba
23. Administrator of Cacoma
24. Administrator of Bimbe
25. Administrator of Calepi
26. Administrator of Cutemba
27. Administrator of Balangue
28. Administrator of Cassequel
29. Administrator of Terra Nova
30. Administrator of Capaia
31. Administrator of Luangue
32. Administrator of Cazaji
33. Administrator of Luma Cassai
34. Administrator of N'Gola Luige
35. Administrator of Caxinga

36. Administrator of Luemba
37. Administrator of Quihuhu
38. Administrator of Tempue
39. Administrator of Quimboa
40. Administrator of Cambamba
41. Administrator of Cuilo
42. Administrator of Cuilo Futa
43. Administrator of de Songo
44. Administrator of Lufico
45. Administrator of Cassamba

Note. Thirty commune administrators to be indicated later on by the Government.

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/638
31 May 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992 and all subsequent relevant resolutions,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 24 May 1994 (S/1994/614),

Reaffirming the commitment of the international community to assisting the Somali people to attain political reconciliation and reconstruction,

Emphasizing in this context that the people of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility for achieving national reconciliation and for rebuilding their country,

Stressing the importance the Council attaches to the Somali parties working seriously to achieve peace and national reconciliation in their country and to their fulfilling in good faith all obligations and agreements to which they commit themselves,

Welcoming the Declaration of the Leaders of the Somali Political Organizations signed in Nairobi, Kenya, on 24 March 1994 (S/1994/614, annex I), which, inter alia, committed the Somali parties to restore peace throughout Somalia, to set up rules and procedures of voting and criteria of participation in the national reconciliation conference, to convene a national reconciliation conference to elect a President, Vice-Presidents, and to appoint a Prime Minister, to complete and review the formation of local authorities, and to establish an independent judiciary,

Welcoming also the Lower Juba regional conference,

Concerned none the less at the delays in the reconciliation process, and at the deterioration in the security situation,

Condemning the continuing incidents of fighting and banditry and, in particular, violence and armed attacks against persons engaged in humanitarian and peace-keeping efforts,

Paying tribute to those troops and humanitarian personnel of several countries who have been killed or injured while serving in Somalia,

Re-emphasizing the importance the Council attaches to the safety and security of United Nations and other personnel engaged in humanitarian relief and peace-keeping throughout Somalia,

Paying tribute to the humanitarian work being undertaken by United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations in difficult conditions to assist the people of Somalia,

Taking note that all Somali leaders have appealed to UNOSOM II to continue supporting their reconciliation and rehabilitation efforts,

Reaffirming the objective that UNOSOM II complete its mission by March 1995,

Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to threaten peace and security and having regard to the exceptional circumstances, including in particular the absence of a government in Somalia, and acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General (S/1994/614);

2. Decides to renew the mandate of UNOSOM II for an additional period expiring on 30 September 1994, subject to a review by the Council no later than 29 July 1994 based on a report by the Secretary-General on the humanitarian mission carried out by UNOSOM and on the political and security situation in Somalia and progress made in achieving national reconciliation, in the light of which report and review the Security Council may request the Secretary-General to prepare options regarding UNOSOM's mandate and future operations;

3. Commends the Secretary-General, his Acting Special Representative and the personnel of UNOSOM II for their efforts towards improving the conditions of the Somali people and in encouraging the process of political reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction;

4. Strongly urges all parties in Somalia to cooperate fully with UNOSOM II, to carry out the commitments and implement the agreements which they have signed including those relating to the voluntary disarmament, and to pursue without further delay the negotiations aimed at achieving national reconciliation;

5. Demands that all parties in Somalia refrain from any acts of intimidation or violence against personnel engaged in humanitarian or peace-keeping work in the country;

6. Reaffirms the obligations of States to implement fully the embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992);

7. Further welcomes the progress made by UNOSOM II in establishing the justice and police programmes and calls for their acceleration;

8. Expresses its appreciation to those Member States which have contributed troops or provided logistical or other assistance to UNOSOM II or have offered to do so, and underlines, in this context, the continuing importance of UNOSOM II having at its disposal the necessary troops, civilian personnel, equipment and financial and logistic support to carry out its mandate effectively;

9. Expresses its appreciation to those Member States which have extended humanitarian assistance or have supported the Somali justice and police programmes and encourages further such contributions on an urgent basis;

10. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/639
31 May 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 29 MAY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF QATAR TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to request a meeting of the Security Council to discuss the situation in Yemen and the resulting tragic loss in civilian lives.

(Signed) Hassan Ali Hussain AL-NI'MAH
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

94-23497 (E) 310594 01/06/94

UNITED NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/640
31 May 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. Shortly after the Security Council adopted resolution 918 (1994), Mr. Iqbal Riza, Assistant Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, and Maj.-Gen. J. Maurice Baril, my Military Adviser, left on a special mission to Rwanda. The present report, presented in response to the Council's request in paragraphs 7 and 20 of the above-mentioned resolution, reflects their findings and recommendations as reviewed by me.

2. The special mission's purpose was:

(a) To move the warring parties towards a cease-fire;

(b) To ascertain from them their views on and intentions towards the implementation of resolution 918 (1994);

(c) To review with the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) the modalities of the concept of operations outlined in my report of 13 May 1994 (S/1994/565).

3. The special mission was in the area from 22 to 27 May 1994. In Kigali it met the Commanders of the Rwandan government forces, namely Maj.-Gen. Augustin Bizimungo, Chief of Staff of the Rwandese Armed Forces, and Maj.-Gen. Augustin Bizilimana, Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie, and, in Gitarama, the head of the "interim Government" formed on 8 April 1994, Mr. Jean Kambanda. On the side of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), it met its Chairman, Col. Alexis Kanyarengwe, in Mulindi and the Commander of the RPF forces, Maj.-Gen. Paul Kagame, in Byumba. In UNAMIR, discussions were held with the Force Commander, Maj.-Gen. Romeo Dallaire, and senior military and civilian officials. During the special mission's visit, my Special Representative, Mr. Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, currently based in Nairobi, was visiting other countries in the region to obtain their support, especially the contribution of troops, for UNAMIR's expanded mandate established by resolution 918 (1994).

4. Both sides had assured Maj.-Gen. Dallaire that they would observe an informal truce during the visit of Mr. Riza and Maj.-Gen. Baril. Nevertheless, firing and shelling continued, especially in and around Kigali, apparently as a result of RPF's continued offensive in the area and the Rwandan government forces' defensive fire. These conditions inconvenienced the special mission's movements somewhat, causing it to lose much time.

II. THE MASSACRES IN RWANDA

5. The number of Rwandan children, women and men who were murdered in the frenzy of massacres over the past seven weeks will probably never be determined accurately. As time passes evidence erodes and witnesses vanish. The estimate is that between 250,000 and 500,000 were killed - a substantial proportion of Rwanda's population of 7 million. In hypothetical proportional terms, this would be approximately equivalent to 2 to 4 million in France, 4 to 8 million in

Bangladesh, 5 to 10 million in Brazil and 9 to 18 million in the United States of America. Tens of thousands more have been maimed or wounded in Rwanda.

6. As noted in the statement of the President of the Security Council of 30 April (S/PRST/1994/21), these massacres and killings have continued in a systematic manner throughout the country, especially in the areas under the control of members or supporters of the armed forces of the interim Government of Rwanda, which was installed immediately after the death of the late President in the crash of his aircraft on 6 April. This assessment has been corroborated in the talks that the special mission had with the parties, the Force Commander and other UNAMIR personnel, humanitarian aid personnel and also with journalists who reached the sites of carnage in various parts of Rwanda soon after they occurred.

7. The special mission was informed that the killers included members of the Rwandan government forces, but in the main were drawn from the Presidential Guard and the interhamwe, the youth militia recruited and formed by the late President's party. The head of the interim Government and the chiefs of staff of the Rwandese Armed Forces and the Gendarmerie acknowledged that this was the case, at the same time alleging that RPF bore equal culpability for the massacres. However, this allegation was not corroborated by the sources cited in paragraph 6 above. Their description of events suggested that, as it advanced towards the capital, RPF assembled, in several camps, the population it found, many of whom had fled, presumably along with most of those responsible for the killings. RPF explains that the purpose of these camps is to screen the population for members of interhamwe and others suspected of the killings. According to some of the sources, such individuals, when identified, are executed. RPF denies this charge, declaring that, while such incidents may have occurred in the early stages of its advance, such persons are now being held for investigation and trial. It does, however, acknowledge that armed persons in civilian clothing have been killed by RPF personnel.

8. The special mission found that the RPF zone is virtually empty, although some farmers appear to be returning to their fields from the RPF camps. In the Rwandan government forces-controlled zones, there are increasing numbers of displaced persons who have fled or are fleeing the RPF advance and who are seeking refuge in camps in sub-human conditions with no assurance even of daily food. This exodus is due in part to alarming radio broadcasts from Rwanda government forces zones, especially Radio Mille Collines, which also broadcasts incitements to eliminate RPF supporters. These refugee columns and concentrations are screened by militia and the Rwandan government forces, and there are reports that RPF supporters are killed when identified.

9. RPF declares that the aim of its military offensive is to rescue those - presumably RPF supporters - who find themselves in danger of their lives in the Rwandan government forces zone. Another aim is to seize those responsible for the massacres. Accordingly, RPF insists that a condition for a cease-fire is that the Rwandan government forces commit themselves to halting the killings that still are taking place. (This point has been included in the draft cease-fire document mentioned in paragraph 14.)

10. The summary above, based on information obtained by the special mission, carries prima facie credibility in the light of circumstantial evidence. Clearly, only a proper investigation can establish the facts and definite culpability, but the efficacy of such an exercise diminishes as time weakens evidence and disperses living witnesses.

11. In this context, the Security Council should be made aware of certain events that, in retrospect, might have had implications regarding the massacres. Between December 1993 and March 1994, UNAMIR took note on several occasions of inflammatory broadcasts by Radio Mille Collines and suspicious movements by armed groups, apparently include the interhamwe, and cautioned the provisional Government in both respects. UNAMIR also received evidence that arms were being brought into the country and protested to the provisional Government and also conveyed this information to the diplomatic community. On one occasion the Force Commander requested Headquarters for permission to use force to recover a cache of arms and was instructed to insist that the Gendarmerie conduct that operation under UNAMIR supervision.

III. MILITARY ASPECTS

12. As the members of the Council are aware, on the second day after the crash of the presidential aircraft and the start of the massacres, RPF launched a military offensive against the Rwandan government forces and the "interim Government". At the present time, RPF holds about half of the territory of Rwanda (see attached map), including strong positions in and around Kigali, especially the airport and its approaches. This brings RPF to control parts of the borders with Burundi and the United Republic of Tanzania in addition to the entire border with Uganda. The Rwandan government forces hold the rest of the country, mainly the areas west and south of the capital and a stronghold in the Gisyeni-Ruhengeri area in the north-west, where fighting continues. These areas abut on parts of the borders with Burundi and Zaire.

13. Kigali is virtually a ghost city devoid of normal activity. As RPF strengthens its hold on the capital, refugees have been streaming out of the city through the only accessible exit towards Gitarama in the west, some continuing south. The Rwandan government forces have also withdrawn a substantial number of their forces, redeploying them in the Gitarama area and other positions in the west and south. Control of the capital appears to hang in balance, while intense fighting continues.

14. In this situation, the special mission was able to obtain the agreement of the two sides to initiate talks for the establishment of a cease-fire as called for by the Security Council in resolution 918 (1994). RPF's insistence that it would not deal, directly or indirectly, with the de facto authorities in Gitarama was accepted by the other side. A working paper, to serve as a basis for the talks, was prepared by the special mission and the Force Commander. The first meeting was held between military staff officers on 30 May at UNAMIR headquarters with the Deputy Force Commander acting as intermediary, and the talks were to resume on 2 June.

IV. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

15. The repercussions of the convulsion in Rwanda are enormous. Estimates, in the unsettled conditions prevailing, indicate that displaced persons are in the range of 1.5 million, with an additional 400,000 refugees in bordering countries. This would mean that over a quarter of Rwanda's population has been afflicted. The greater number of displaced persons are in zones controlled by the Rwandan government forces, where authority beyond Gitarama, Giseyeni and Butare appears to be uncertain. Consequently, neither United Nations agencies nor non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been able to commence an effective programme, beyond sporadic deliveries where possible. In the RPF zone, more systematic humanitarian assistance programmes have commenced, but under strict RPF controls, against which the organizations distributing assistance have protested. These programmes are conducted from Kabale, in southern Uganda, by the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and NGOs. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is supporting refugees in the neighbouring countries. These activities are coordinated by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs through arrangements outlined in my last report (S/1994/565).

16. The special mission emphasized to the de facto authorities in Gitarama and to the Rwandan government forces military commanders the urgency of assuring conditions in the Rwandan government forces zone that would enable humanitarian assistance programmes to be commenced in those areas, as called for in resolution 918 (1994). Humanitarian agencies and NGOs also are making efforts to obtain such assurances. At present only ICRC maintains a presence in both Rwandan government forces and RPF zones and provides critical assistance, mainly medical, to the extent of its abilities and at high risk to its personnel. It is obvious that, in the conditions outlined in paragraphs 7 and 8 above, it is very urgent that, as called for in resolution 918 (1994), "secure humanitarian areas" be established where the estimated 2 million of these unfortunate displaced persons can be provided both security and assistance. They may require this support for an extended period even after a cease-fire, until conditions permit them to return to their homes, or settle elsewhere, in reasonable safety.

V. EXPANDED MANDATE OF UNAMIR

17. It is evident that, even after a cease-fire is established, conditions in Rwanda will remain uncertain and insecure in many areas for an extended period. Stability will return only when agreement on the resumption of a negotiated political process is reached. It is in this expectation that UNAMIR has to commence its additional tasks.

A. Cooperation by the parties

18. The most important prerequisite, assurances from both parties of cooperation with the mandate established by resolution 918 (1994), was secured by the special mission, although these assurances will require formalization as

operations are initiated. However, their assurances will remain linked to the level of control both sides can exercise over their troops and armed elements. Under this mandate, UNAMIR will be required to carry out primarily two interlinked tasks, while continuing its mediation role in the talks for a cease-fire:

(a) To attempt to assure the security of as many assemblies as possible of civilians who are under threat;

(b) To provide security, as required, to humanitarian relief operations.

19. The conclusion of the special mission, after its discussions in Rwanda, is that the concept of operations outlined in my last report (S/1994/585) will require some adjustments as the situation evolves and more reliable data become available regarding threatened groups and displaced persons, especially in the Rwandan government forces zone. While agreeing to cooperate with UNAMIR in its tasks and in the deployment of its additional personnel, both sides raised questions regarding the conduct of operations on the ground. In particular, RPF expressed strong doubts as to whether 5,500 troops would be required, and the rationale was explained to them. The planned modalities of deployment are outlined below.

B. Kigali airport

20. As regards the concept of Kigali airport as a neutral zone, which is included in resolution 918 (1994), the Council will recall that, despite Maj.-Gen. Dallaire's best efforts both before and after the adoption of the resolution, the Rwandan government forces did not transfer the control of the airport to UNAMIR. Subsequently, RPF occupied the airport by military means on 21 May and does not agree to relinquish control, citing UNAMIR's failure to obtain the same from the Rwandan government forces. It has indicated, however, that it would agree to a strengthened UNAMIR presence at the airport under arrangements similar to those which prevailed up to 6 April with Rwandan government forces units (which were at the airport under the terms of the Arusha agreement) now being substituted by RPF units. RPF would encourage and allow civilian technical and operational staff to return to their duties in order to reactivate the airport, and would cooperate with UNAMIR in ensuring the safety of flights. The Rwandan government forces could, however, disrupt or halt operation of the airport with indirect fire, but assured the special mission that they would not interfere.

C. Phase 1

21. The implementation of phase 1 of the operation clearly remains urgent and must be commenced without further delay, even before a cease-fire is effected. The Government of Ghana is prepared to dispatch the required troops immediately. However, they can be deployed only when essential equipment, especially armoured personnel carriers, is provided and moved to Rwanda. Without equipment, the troops would be unprotected, immobile and ineffective. With these questions still to be settled, it is estimated that phase 1 will not be operational for

another four to six weeks, depending on how soon the resources required are made available by Member States and delivered on the ground.

22. In this first phase, UNAMIR would strengthen its position in Kigali, including at the airport, and establish a mobile reserve for deployment wherever required for emergencies, including reinforcement. About half the battalion would be deployed to provide some security to major concentrations of displaced persons in the interior of Rwanda where they are in most danger. UNAMIR would make clear to the authorities concerned that they are primarily responsible for the safety of these civilian groups under monitoring by UNAMIR, which would be prepared to take the measures necessary should this responsibility be violated. Military observers would be stationed in other places where assembled civilians are not under immediate threat. During this first phase, UNAMIR also would establish security for major humanitarian supply depots and provide some escorts to convoys as required.

D. Phase 2

23. Because of the projected long delay in deploying the troops and equipment for phase 1, phase 2 should be initiated immediately, in close synchronization with phase 1. Owing to the logistical limitations of Kigali airport, alternative entry points would be utilized to deploy the two additional battalions, one mechanized and one motorized. This phase would be implemented in one of two possible scenarios:

(a) No cease-fire in place at the time of deployment. In this scenario, the additional units would establish and protect "secure areas", either by extending protection to existing assembly areas of threatened civilians or setting up new areas to which endangered civilians could be moved for safety. Clearly, the intention would be to maintain these secure areas only until such time as displaced persons can return to their places of origin or settle in other areas of their choice in reasonably secure conditions;

(b) Cease-fire in place at the time of deployment. In this scenario, displaced persons may be expected to begin to move out of the areas where they are assembled, and, therefore, resources required to protect "secure areas" can be reduced. This would enable UNAMIR to divert some of its additional resources in phase 2 towards monitoring the cease-fire on the terms agreed upon by the two parties. There is no intention to have UNAMIR assume the role of a buffer force unless the two parties so request and the Council approves.

E. Phase 3

24. The need to deploy the two battalions envisaged for phase 3 would depend upon how one of the scenarios in phase 2 unfolds. If a cease-fire is still not established, the experience of phase 2 will determine whether the mandate and the concept of operations are demonstrating a level of effectiveness that requires reinforcement by the units envisaged for phase 3. If not, the mandate or operational plan or both may require revision. Alternatively, if a cease-

fire is established, it might be decided that these additional resources would not be required. In either case, urgent preparations for phase 3 must continue.

F. Flexibility of operations

25. During all three phases, flexible contingency plans would be in place to ensure the effective use of available assets to respond to demands of a situation that is, and is likely to remain, fluid for some time before it stabilizes. For instance, should Kigali airport not be operational or accessible, other airfields have already been identified and reconnaissance carried out. In areas where humanitarian operations from bordering countries are evaluated as more effective in bringing assistance to displaced persons inside Rwanda, these routes would be used where required. Protection would be provided by UNAMIR to these operations, whether within the country or across borders, to the extent permitted by its available resources. In brief, coordination between UNAMIR and humanitarian agencies and NGOs would determine the most effective combination of "inside in" and "outside in" operations.

26. It is important for Council members to keep in mind that the concept of operations and the various scenarios are predicated on the assumption that the required troops with full equipment are made available to UNAMIR by Governments without further delay. Unless Member States show a determination to take prompt and decisive action, UNAMIR will not be able to implement its mandate effectively or to have the impact required to improve the lot of the Rwandese people and begin to alleviate the intense suffering to which they have been subjected.

VI. POLITICAL PROSPECTS

27. It is axiomatic that any hope of resolving the historical tensions in Rwanda must rest on the prospects of a political compromise. Indeed, such were precisely the premise and goal of the Arusha agreement of 4 August 1993. The Security Council established UNAMIR to assist the parties in implementing the agreement, this task being disrupted by the breakdown of the Arusha process in the aftermath of the death of the late President on 6 April 1994.

28. As the members of the Security Council are aware, the circumstances surrounding the crash of the presidential aircraft, in which the President of Burundi was also killed, engender extreme suspicion. Only a thorough investigation could determine whether the aircraft was brought down deliberately. If so, it would be critical to identify the source of attack, as this would indicate a possible political motive, perhaps even whether the violence that followed was part of a planned pogrom. Regrettably, here also the passage of time, with its accompanying deterioration of evidence and dispersal of witnesses, will make it difficult to establish the facts.

29. It is encouraging that, in their discussions with Mr. Riza and Maj.-Gen. Baril, both sides recognized that only a political settlement could bring stability to Rwanda and that there could be no military solution. In this context, while both sides declared that the principles of the Arusha peace

agreement remained valid as a framework, each stated that the new circumstances would necessitate renegotiation of certain parts of the agreement. Clearly, there is little likelihood that their approaches and aims in such negotiations would coincide. Therefore, this positive sign notwithstanding, it is evident that, even after a cease-fire, the initiation of negotiations will not be smooth.

A. Position of the "interim Government"

30. The head of the "interim Government" declared bluntly that the Arusha agreement rested on the fallacious premise that the tensions in Rwanda could be resolved by a political formula. The fundamental problem was ethnic: the historic animosity between the majority Hutu who in the past had been ruled by the minority Tutsi. The Tutsi had never reconciled themselves to the democratic principle of government by the majority following the elections held on 18 September 1961 under United Nations supervision. Over the last 30 years, from bases in Uganda, the Tutsi had repeatedly tried to overthrow the democratic system by force. Having failed, they had resorted to a political stratagem following the introduction by the late President Habyarimana of a multiparty system in Rwanda in 1991. Having formed RPF as a political party, the Tutsi had induced other opposition parties to join the stratagem of arrogating to RPF far more political power than their demographic proportion of 15 per cent justified.

31. The negotiations at Arusha had been part of this stratagem, of which the mediators and the international community were unaware. Subsequently, RPF manoeuvres had "radicalized" the implementation process, split the opposition parties and aggravated tensions. Thus, RPF had exacerbated ethnic fears and animosities to a degree that, even had the broad-based transitional Government envisaged in the Arusha agreement been installed, violence against their supporters inevitably would have exploded. Now there could be no military solution: even if RPF expelled the Hutu population from Rwanda, they eventually would return to claim their rightful place. Therefore, in the view of this de facto authority, the only possible solution was a negotiated power-sharing formula within the principles of the Arusha agreement. This must guarantee the rights of both the minority and the majority, so that one would not fear domination by the other. Elections simply by themselves were not the answer, as they always would result in a Hutu majority Government, and there was no intention of installing permanent rule by the majority.

B. Position of RPF

32. The RPF position is that, although carrying a strong ethnic element, Rwanda's problems are political. RPF was formed as a multi-ethnic party and its aim was to promote political pluralism rather than ethnic rivalry. Extremist elements in the late President Habyarimana's party, the Mouvement républicain national pour la démocratie et le développement, in an anti-Tutsi party, the Comité démocratique républicain, and in the Rwandan government forces simply had not reconciled themselves to the political compromise in the Arusha agreement, which required the establishment of a broad-based transitional Government leading to elections in 1995. They had engineered repeated delays in the

installation of the transitional Government, and had made repeated efforts for the inclusion in it of the extremist Comité démocratique républicain, thus infringing the Arusha agreement. These attempts to subvert the peace process having failed, these extremist groups had decided to resort to the extermination of the leaders, allies and supporters of RPF. A plan for widespread killings throughout the country had been prepared and targets identified. The coup had commenced with the assassination of the President on his return from Dar es Salaam, where he had agreed, with the Presidents of the United Republic of Tanzania and Burundi, to disregard the pressures from the extremists and to proceed with the installation of the transitional Government. The systematic manner and the scale of the massacres was clear evidence that these were not spontaneous or random killings.

33. RPF takes the position that the "interim Government" was installed by the same extremist elements in the Mouvement républicain national pour la démocratie et le développement and the Rwandan government forces who had planned and executed the massacres. Therefore, RPF considered the "interim Government" a "criminal group" as well as an illegal entity and would have no contact with it, direct or indirect. Indeed, RPF is "appalled" that the United Nations and Governments deal with this entity, even more so when they allow it to participate in decisions taken by the Security Council to deal with the situation in Rwanda that the "interim Government" itself has instigated, while RPF as the other party cannot express its views.

34. RPF declares that it does not seek to impose a military solution, and would enter into political negotiations, within the principles of the Arusha agreement, only with representatives of political parties, including the Mouvement républicain national pour la démocratie et le développement, who did not comprise individuals involved with planning and executing the massacres of RPF supporters. Meanwhile, RPF would agree to cease-fire talks with Rwandan government forces officers since the military was the only functioning institution, despite the fact that its personnel had participated in the massacres. RPF agreed that an early cease-fire was essential to spare the Rwandese population continued suffering, but to achieve this aim the Rwandan government forces would have to commit themselves to halting the killings that still were continuing in the Rwandan government forces-controlled zone. This position of the Rwandese Patriotic Front given to the special mission was also conveyed directly to me in my meeting at Headquarters on 24 May 1994 with the First Vice-President of the Rwandese Patriotic Front, Mr. Patrick Mazimhaka.

C. Arusha framework

35. It thus is evident that, even when a cease-fire is achieved, the positions of the two parties are such that a determined mediation effort will be required to bring mutually acceptable interlocutors to the negotiating table. Nevertheless, it is a positive sign that both sides accept that the negotiations would be in the framework of the Arusha agreement and that both sides would seek a durable political formula to determine the sharing of power in order to resolve the specific problems of Rwanda.

VII. OBSERVATIONS

36. The magnitude of the human calamity that has engulfed Rwanda might be unimaginable but for its having transpired. On the basis of the evidence that has emerged, there can be little doubt that it constitutes genocide, since there have been large-scale killings of communities and families belonging to a particular ethnic group. The continuing hostilities impede a full investigation of these massacres and, regrettably, in any case procedures in the United Nations do not lend themselves to immediate action in such circumstances. In this situation, the international community must thank the men and women working in UNAMIR, humanitarian agencies, NGOs and the media for conveying the dimensions of the horror that overtook the people of Rwanda.

37. As the Security Council is informed, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr. Joseph Ayala Lasso, has visited Rwanda. He has presented his report to the Commission on Human Rights, which has designated Mr. René Degni Segui as Special Rapporteur for Rwanda.

38. In the meantime, it is unacceptable that, almost two months since this violence exploded, killings still continue. Both parties must immediately cease such activities, there being strong evidence that the overwhelming responsibility lies with the "interim Government" and the Rwandan government forces, which must immediately take effective measures to halt such killings in the zone under their control. It would be senseless to attempt to establish a cease-fire and to allow deliberate killings of civilians in the Rwandan government forces zone to continue. There is the danger that, if not stopped, this would lead to reprisals and counter-reprisals, setting off a prolonged cycle of violence.

39. Nevertheless, it is gratifying that the military authorities of both sides have commenced talks towards a cease-fire. I hope that they will show flexibility and enough concern for the suffering of their civilian compatriots to reach early agreement on cease-fire terms. The Force Commander of UNAMIR will make every effort to facilitate these talks and to support the practical implementation of the arrangements agreed upon. However, I repeat that a halt to the killings of civilians must be concomitant with a cease-fire.

40. The immediate priorities are to relieve the suffering of the displaced population and the fears of civilians under threat. The first requires organized humanitarian relief operations, which cannot be launched on the scale required unless adequate security conditions for them can be established. UNAMIR has already prepared plans to provide these conditions, which encompasses the second priority, the security of assemblies of civilians in peril. The ultimate aim of these humanitarian and security efforts would be, of course, to enable those affected to return to their homes or to seek security elsewhere in Rwanda as soon as conditions permit. As indicated above, some humanitarian relief is reaching the RPF zone. However, this does not appear practicable in the Rwandan government forces zone, where most of the displaced population is found, until UNAMIR is enabled to establish adequate security conditions there, while also introducing monitoring arrangements in the RPF zone. Clearly, these tasks assigned to UNAMIR by the Security Council in resolution 918 (1994) require the urgent provision of the necessary resources by Member States. I

therefore again appeal to Governments to respond urgently to this need. I am grateful to the Governments of Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal and Zimbabwe for their offers of troops. However, these cannot be dispatched until the proper equipment is provided by other Governments.

41. Only when the killings have been halted, when a cease-fire is effective, humanitarian relief being provided and some semblance of security for the population returns can there be hope for the underlying political issues to be addressed through negotiations. At that stage, it will be essential that the Organization of African Unity (OAU), neighbouring and regional Governments and all other interested Governments exert their influence upon both sides to demonstrate the commitment to compromise that alone can result in a mutually acceptable and durable political solution to Rwanda's particular problems. It is essential that the arms embargo imposed by resolution 918 (1994) be respected, and that no armaments reach either party across any of Rwanda's borders. In this context, I intend to review the role of UNOMUR, which monitors only the border with Uganda, to assess whether it would be advantageous to integrate its resources into UNAMIR to strengthen the latter.

42. I trust that the information and assessments in the present report will enable the Security Council to review the situation in Rwanda, where a humanitarian disaster, combined with widespread violence, requires urgent and decisive action. The two parties have commenced talks towards a cease-fire, but it is evident that national reconciliation will not be facile or swift. It will take some time for the Rwandese people to come to terms to reach a durable political compromise to resolve their tensions. It is the duty of the United Nations to assist in whichever way it can. I, therefore, recommend that the expanded mandate for UNAMIR be authorized by the Council for an initial period of six months, with the anticipation that at least another six-month renewal will be required. I intend to establish a special trust fund to support effective rehabilitation programmes in Rwanda, and I appeal to all Governments to contribute to it generously.

43. The delay in reaction by the international community to the genocide in Rwanda has demonstrated graphically its extreme inadequacy to respond urgently with prompt and decisive action to humanitarian crises entwined with armed conflict. Having quickly reduced UNAMIR to a minimal presence on the ground, since its original mandate did not allow it to take action when the carnage started, the international community appears paralysed in reacting almost two months later even to the revised mandate established by the Security Council. We all must recognize that, in this respect, we have failed in our response to the agony of Rwanda, and thus have acquiesced in the continued loss of human lives. Our readiness and capacity for action has been demonstrated to be inadequate at best, and deplorable at worst, owing to the absence of the collective political will. While attempting now to redeem these failings in the Rwandese crisis, the entire system requires review to strengthen its reactive capacity. It is my intention that such a review be conducted.

44. In concluding the present report, I should like to express my appreciation to Mr. Riza and Maj.-Gen. Baril for willingly undertaking this difficult mission. I also wish to express my appreciation to my Special Representative, Mr. Booh-Booh, for his efforts to obtain support from Governments in the region

to deal with the crisis in Rwanda. Even more, I reiterate once again my gratitude and high admiration to Maj.-Gen. Dallaire and the men and women of UNAMIR for their courage and continued dedication to their mission and to the Rwandese people under arduous and dangerous conditions.



MAP NO. 3833 UNITED NATIONS
MAY 1994

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/641
31 May 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 31 MAY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF YEMEN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to present to you the attached message dated 27 May 1994 from the Yemeni political parties and organizations on the situation in Yemen.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating the present letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdalla Saleh AL-ASHTAL
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

[Original: Arabic]

Message dated 27 May 1994 from Yemeni political parties and organizations addressed to the President of the Security Council

We wish to call your attention and that of the States members of the Security Council to our absolute rejection of any intervention by the Council in what is taking place in our country. This is an internal matter, and what is happening is an endeavour by the entire people to preserve the unity that guarantees its stability and the stability of the region in the face of a separatist rebellion aimed against the country's unity, constitutional legitimacy and stability. This attempt is representative only of its perpetrators and not of the Yemeni people, which unanimously upholds unity.

You should realize that the intrusion of the Security Council into an internal matter such as this would only serve to complicate the issue. Moreover, it would be prejudicial to the sincere Yemeni efforts being made to put an end to the rebellion and to contain it on the basis of preserving the unity of our country and of commitment to the Constitution and to the constitutional legitimacy promoted by the first free and democratic elections, held on 27 April 1993 and witnessed by the entire world, first and foremost the five permanent members of the Council.

Any intervention would be an assault on the territorial unity and sovereignty of the Republic of Yemen and would be unacceptable to our people and inadmissible under the established rules of international law regarding the sovereignty of States Members of the United Nations.

We urge the Council, for the sake of preserving international peace and security, to advise all States in the region to respect the sovereignty of the Republic of Yemen, to adhere strictly to the rules of international law and the Charter of the United Nations and to refrain from intervening in the internal affairs of Yemen.

We request you to have this telegram circulated to all Member States as a document of the United Nations.

(Signed)

Parties and mass, occupational and popular formations and organizations in the Republic of Yemen

1. Unionist members of the Politburo, of the Central Committee and of the Parliamentary Bloc of the Socialist Party:

Ali Salih Abbad MUQBIL (Member of the Bureau of the Parliament, leader of the Parliamentary Bloc of the Socialist Party and member of the Politburo)

2. Arab Socialist Baath Party:

Qasim SALAM (Secretary-General)

3. Nasserite Popular Unionist Party:

Abd al-Malik AL-MUKHLAFI (Secretary-General)

4. Al-Haqq Party:

Judge Ahmad AL-SHAMI (Secretary-General)

5. Nasserite Democratic Party:

Abduh Muhammad AL-JUNDI (Secretary-General)

6. National Front Party:

Abd Allah Ali AL-SALAMI (Secretary-General)

7. Sons of Yemen League Party - Legitimate Leadership:

Awad AL-BATRA (Secretary-General)

8. September Democratic Organization:

Ahmad FARHASH (Secretary-General)

9. National Socialist Party:

Abd al-Aziz AL-BAKIR (Secretary-General)

10. Yemen Reform Group:

Muhammad AL-BADUMI (Assistant Secretary-General)

11. General Popular Congress:

Abd al-Hamid AL-HADI (Member of the General Committee)

12. Liberation Front:

Husayn Abd Allah ABDUH (Secretary-General)

13. National Solidarity:

Muhammad AL-SALAHI (Secretary-General)

14. Liberation Front Popular Organization:

Muhammad Ahmad SALIH (Secretary-General)

15. Yemeni Renaissance Movement Party:

Sadiq Sha'if NU'MAN (Secretary-General)

16. Yemen Revolutionary Democratic Party:

Mabkhut AL-ZANIBI (Secretary-General)

17. Nasserite Correction Party:

Abd al-Aziz MUQBIL (Secretary-General)

18. Human Rights Organization:

Judge Hamud AL-HATTAR (Secretary-General)

19. Yemen Revolutionary Militants Party:

Hammud BAYDAR (Secretary-General)

20. Arab Socialist Baath Party Organization:

Muhammad Ahmad SHAKIR (Secretary-General)

21. Confederation of Yemeni Trade Unions:

Yahya AL-KAHLANI (Secretary-General)

22. Confederation of Yemeni Students:

Abd al-Hamid AL-MASURI (President)

23. Association of Yemeni Writers and Authors:

Yusuf AL-SHAHARI (President)

24. Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry:

Al-Haj Husayn AL-WATTARI (President)

25. Agricultural Cooperative Association:

Abd- al-Rahman AL-ALFI (President)

26. Yemen Women's Federation:

Atikah AL-SHAMI (President)

27. Yemen Jurists' Association:

Abd al-Fattah AL-BASIR (President)

28. Yemeni Engineers' Union:

Ahmad AL-AYNI (President)

29. Yemeni Lawyers' Union:

Muhammad Naji ALA (President)

30. Yemeni Journalists' Union:

Abd al-Bari TAHIR (President)

31. Yemeni Historians' Society:

Husayn AL-UMRI (President)

32. Yemeni Economists' Society:

Nasir AL-AULAQI (President)

33. Yemeni Scholars' Society:

Judge Muhammad AL-HAJJI (President of the Society)

*Note. Copy to all embassies of States members of the Security Council accredited to the Republic of Yemen.

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/642
31 May 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 31 MAY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF YEMEN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter dated 29 May 1994 addressed to you by the Parliament of the Republic of Yemen on the situation in Yemen.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdalla Saleh AL-ASHTAL
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex

[Original: Arabic]

Letter dated 29 May 1994 from the Parliament of the Republic of Yemen addressed to the Secretary-General

We in the elected Parliament of the Republic of Yemen convey to you our great appreciation and respect for the positions you have taken that embody the desire to protect the sovereignty, freedom and independence of peoples and the endeavour to safeguard them through the activities of your Organization. Our Yemeni people is proud that its State belongs to this Organization, and it hopes that the positions in question will be reinforced when you come to address yourself to the internal events taking place in our country, linked as they are in essence with the maintenance of its sovereignty, security and independence in keeping with the Constitution and laws in force.

It has come to our attention that you have begun to address the question of Yemen and of the events taking place in our country as a result of the rebellion of a group of Socialist Party leaders against constitutional legitimacy and the war launched by them against the Yemeni people and its unity for inhuman reasons that have no basis in law and are not endorsed by the Constitution.

Although we are most proud and appreciative of your interest in the course of events in our country and of your concern that it be spared from catastrophe, we nevertheless wish to convey to you our great surprise and sorrow at the fact that you are addressing this internal issue of ours on the basis of erroneous information and through intermediaries who are not involved, despite the fact that our State is an active Member of the United Nations and has yet to make any request to you in this regard.

Allow us, therefore, to place before the Organization a number of facts that we hope will help you towards a true understanding of the Yemeni issue and in whose light you may approach what is taking place. The facts can be summarized as follows:

1. In its history and its culture, Yemen, the land and its people, has always been a single unit. It has no racial or ethnic minorities, and the circumstances in which it has been divided have been exceptional and have come about owing to colonialism and external interference in the country's affairs.

2. The unification of Yemen that was achieved on 22 May 1990 and was welcomed with felicitations at both the inter-Arab and international levels is the unification of two politician regimes and not of two different peoples. It took place in a peaceful and democratic manner in accordance with the agreement proclaiming the Republic of Yemen and regulating the transitional period and with the Constitution of the unified State, as signed by the Presidents of the two former regimes in April 1990 and ratified by the representative assemblies of the two formerly separate parts of the country.

3. The first national consensus on the unification of Yemen was achieved when the plebiscite on the Constitution of the unified State was held in 1991, and international organizations for the promotion of democracy participated in supervising its fairness.

4. On 27 April 1993, our country's first unified parliamentary elections were held and more than 22 parties and political organizations took part as well as independents, in accordance with the General Elections Law. The entire world witnessed the fairness of these elections, which took place on a free and democratic basis. They were subjected to the direct supervision of international institutions for the promotion of democracy and were welcomed by all the international human rights bodies and organizations. Your Organization and the five permanent members of the Security Council were in the forefront of those who endorsed the results of the elections.

The elections of 27 April 1993, the results of which were recognized by all political parties and organizations, including the Socialist Party, moved Yemen on, after four years of unity, from the legitimacy inherent in amalgamation by political agreement to that of unity of constitutional and legal institutions. As a result of the elections, the first unified Parliament was convened on 15 May 1993 and representation by territorial constituency was abolished in accordance with article 58 of the Constitution of the Republic of Yemen, which states that "A member of the Parliament represents the entire people and has regard for the general interest, and his representative function is not limited by any restriction or condition".

5. After the elections, the Republic of Yemen entered upon a new experience of government and a coalition was formed that included the three major parties; the General People's Congress, the Yemen Reform Grouping and the Socialist Party. The two former parties agreed that the latter should have a far greater number of ministerial portfolios in the new arrangement than its proportional representation in the Parliament would warrant out of concern for national concord. The coalition adopted a document called the "Government Coalition Document", which affirmed commitment to those points established as constant elements of national policy, including the commitment to maintain and not to relinquish national unity as a sovereign matter whose endangerment or infringement is forbidden.

6. The unified Yemeni State adhered to democratic practice in keeping with political pluralism and freedom of opinion, and the political arena in Yemen provided, as it still provides, an open forum for intellectual trends and competing programmes in such a way as to advance the building of society on sound modern foundations based on respect and full consideration for human rights.

Having put you in the picture with regard to the constitutional position of the formation of the unified State and its institutions, we should like hereunder to place before you other facts relating to the attempt to circumvent democracy and constitutional legitimacy in the country and to destroy the unified Yemeni State by a rebel group that has risen up against law and order and has dabbled in violence and in creating an explosive military situation in

order to implement its scheme to rend the unity of a people and defy the will of a nation.

Accordingly, we should like to inform you of the following facts:

1. The separatist gang that calls for the establishment of a State in the south under the leadership of the rebel Ali Salim al-Bidh grew tired of democracy when it found that the electoral decision of 27 April 1993 was not in its favour and did not propel it to the summit of power. Because the members of this rebel gang were the remnants of the totalitarian regimes that governed without rivals and usurped all the civil and political rights of Yemenis, they had a strong nostalgia for the bloody past and began to ponder the overthrow of constitutional legitimacy by creating crises, arranging explosions and assassinations and undermining the security of the unified State.

2. When the separatists found that they had failed in this course, they resorted to aggravating the political and economic situation and confusing the democratic situation by raising new conditions and demands with the aim of abrogating the legitimacy of constitutional institutions. They declared their rejection of the democratic majority and preached a democracy based on the principle of a balance of interests, which is a new term in the study of democracy of which no explanation is to be found from democratic legislators.

3. Ali Salim al-Bidh, the leader of the rebels, refused to submit to the Constitution and the laws and statutes of the country, and he exercised his authority as Deputy President of the unified State for almost one entire year without completing the constitutional formalities.

4. By virtue of their participation in power, the separatist rebels rendered inoperative the constitutional institutions of the State by isolating themselves in Aden, the economic and commercial capital, and by sabotaging these institutions. The country almost fell into a state of complete anarchy, the economic, social and health situation deteriorated, the security situation worsened, and the most heinous violations of human rights took place in the prisons of Aden that these persons subjected to their direct control.

5. The legitimate leadership of the country engaged in dialogue with the rebels in partnership with patriotic forces and political parties and organizations. This dialogue, which lasted some nine months, produced the "compact and agreement document". Scarcely had the document been signed in the Jordanian capital, Amman, on 20 February 1994 than the rebels created an explosive military situation in the Abyan Governorate involving a unionist camp located there and defenceless citizens residing in the Governorate.

6. The rebels continued to prepare for the overthrow of democracy, legitimacy and unity until they were able to ignite the military situation fully at Umran on 27 April 1994 (the first anniversary of the democratic elections). This took place in the presence of the military attachés of the United States of America and of France, who were on mission with the military committee.

7. On 21 May 1994 (on the eve of the fourth anniversary of the establishment of the unified State), the rebel Ali Salim al-Bidh issued what he called the

"Declaration of the Democratic Republic of Yemen" and, in a dangerous and unlawful precedent, called for the recognition of a State that he seeks to sever from a homeland that has a single origin, culture, faith, history and language.

We in the Yemeni Parliament regard this declaration as null and void and as unlawful in light of article 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Yemen, which provides that "The Republic of Yemen is an independent, sovereign State, it is an indivisible unit, and no part thereof may be relinquished ...".

In accordance with this provision of the Constitution, we would regard recognition of this separatist declaration by any party, State or organization as an outrage against the right of our Yemeni people to affiliation with a unitary homeland and as a violation of article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that everyone has a right to a nationality and that no one shall be deprived of his nationality or forced to change it. Any attempt to treat with this rebel group is an offence to the national dignity of Yemen and a warning of displacement and perdition to Yemeni citizens.

On the basis of the foregoing considerations, which put you squarely in the picture with regard to the true nature of our people's cause in the Republic of Yemen, we urge you to reject all requests made to you by any party with regard to the issue between our people and those in rebellion against legitimacy and the law on the grounds that this is an internal matter within the meaning of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter of the United Nations. That Article states that:

> "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII."

We should like to call your attention to the fact that the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations affirm that no State Member of the United Nations may submit the matter of an internal conflict other than in the case where its interests are harmed or where the dispute threatens international peace and security. Neither of these requirements is met in the case of the Yemen question. The legitimate leadership, in confronting the rebels, does so only in order to ensure security and stability, protect the national sovereignty and inculcate the values of democracy in light of respect for law and order and within the sovereign boundaries of the country. The interests and rights of States are to be safeguarded and respected.

We believe that such a posture presents a threat to international peace and security only if there are one or more States in the region that are preparing to commit aggression against Yemen and to violate its territory, and this we still do not know.

We in the Parliament of the Republic of Yemen would like to assure you of the following:

(a) The unification of Yemen is the destiny of the Yemeni people, and any retreat from it or any haggling over it after it has become an established national fact will inevitably have the following results:

Prolongation of the warfare and fighting in Yemen, which may lead to abandonment of the democratic experiment that is in keeping with the new international order;

Creation of an unstable security situation in the region, thereby undoubtedly affecting the security and stability of neighbouring States and consequently jeopardizing international interests;

Creation of a new polarization of regional and international conflicts in the region.

(b) What is taking place in Yemen is not a war between north and south, as some claim, or between one State and another. It is a war between the people as represented by its lawful and constitutionally elected leadership and a small rebel separatist group of Socialist Party leaders.

(c) The rebels do not represent a racial or confessional minority. There are no minorities and no sects in Yemeni society, and it is a society that is unified in orientation and in thought from one end to another.

(d) The adventure embarked upon by the separatist gang in declaring a "State of the South" is an extension of the adventure of the military outbreak in which it did not and shall not persevere, because the people of the southern governorates is fighting alongside the regular forces to safeguard and protect its unity.

While we have high regard for the respect shown by your Organization for human rights and for its endeavours to achieve justice in the world, as representatives of the Yemeni people we urge you:

To deal with what is taking place in our country as an internal matter in accordance with Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter of the United Nations and to reject any request for a discussion of the question of Yemen that is not made by the Government of the Republic of Yemen;

To bring pressure to bear on the States Members of the Organization that are trying to find a foothold for themselves in what is now taking place in Yemen to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of our country, because this is likely to inflame the situation and prolong the warfare and widen its scope.

We request you to have this letter circulated to Member States as a United Nations document.

Issued by the Parliament
of the Republic of Yemen
29 May 1994

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/643
31 May 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 28 MAY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF LEBANON TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to request you to convene an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the abduction by Israeli commandos of Mr. Mustafa Al-Dirani, a Lebanese citizen. This grave and premeditated act of aggression was perpetrated in violation of the territorial integrity of Lebanon, the principles of international law, the Charter of the United Nations and the International Bill of Rights. It also constitutes a direct threat to the ongoing peace process in the Middle East.

(Signed) Khalil MAKKAWI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

94-23459 (E) 310594

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UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/644
31 May 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 31 MAY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF YEMEN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

In reference to the request addressed to you (S/1994/630), to convene a meeting of the Security Council to discuss the situation in Yemen, I would like to inform you that my Government considers the above-mentioned request as interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Yemen, contrary to Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter of the United Nations.

I would like to request you to circulate this letter as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Abdalla S. AL-ASHTAL
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

94-23503 (E) 310594 01/06/94

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/645
31 May 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

FINAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS MILITARY LIAISON TEAM IN CAMBODIA

1. The United Nations Military Liaison Team in Cambodia was established on 15 November 1993 for a single period of six months, pursuant to Security Council resolution 880 (1993) of 4 November 1993. The mandate formally expired and the Team ceased operations on 15 May 1994. It will be recalled that, in February 1994, a mid-term report was issued (S/1994/169), which described the activities of the Military Liaison Team and the prevailing security situation in Cambodia for the first half of the mandate period. The purpose of the present report is to give an overview of the activities of the Military Liaison Team during its entire period of operation, while highlighting major developments affecting the security situation in Cambodia during the second half of the reporting period.

2. The Military Liaison Team continued to maintain its base at Phnom Penh and, in accordance with its mandate, its functions continued to centre around liaison and reporting activities. Liaison was conducted at the ministerial, executive and ambassadorial levels by the Chief Military Liaison Officer and at the functional level by Military Liaison Officers, who reported daily to United Nations Headquarters on security conditions and developments in Cambodia. Officers were also dispatched in mobile teams to observe areas outside Phnom Penh when requested by the Government of Cambodia and when the Chief Military Liaison Officer deemed that the issue involved related to the mandate of the Team. During the course of the reporting period, observation missions were undertaken to Pailin, to camps for defectors from the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK) at Russei Keo and Dei-eth, to a naval base at Ream, to the Officer Training Academy of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) in Kompong Speu province, to the Military Police Training School at Phnom Penh and to a reorganized RCAF infantry division at Lung Vek, north of Phnom Penh.

3. During the reporting period RCAF and NADK continued to fight in the north and north-western parts of the country. RCAF conducted a number of attacks on NADK strongholds at Anlong Veng and Pailin, temporarily capturing both and reportedly causing some 30,000 refugees to cross the border into Thailand. The security situation was reported to have deteriorated extensively, particularly in the provinces of Battambang and Banteay Meanchey.

4. The restructuring of RCAF into 12 divisions was reportedly completed and the areas of responsibilities of the Military Zones were reoriented. The hierarchical structure of the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff Branch of RCAF was also reappraised. The amalgamation of all previous factional forces into RCAF at all levels of command was reportedly effected smoothly, although the distribution of various command, staff and other key appointments may have been determined through ratio proportion among various military factions, with the majority going to the Cambodian People's Party. There appeared to be a conscious effort to conceal previous factional identities. Insufficient and inefficient administrative support, poor infrastructure and logistics and extensive minefields were reported to contribute to low morale in RCAF.

5. On 2 May 1994, the Government of Cambodia, through a letter from the Permanent Representative of Cambodia addressed to me, requested that the mandate of the Military Liaison Team be extended for a further six months. However, by a letter dated 13 May 1994 (S/1994/573), the President of the Security Council informed me that, in accordance with an alternative that I had proposed in a letter dated 6 May 1994 (S/1994/572), the Council had decided not to extend the mandate of the Team, but rather agreed that I should appoint three military advisers in the recently established office of my representative in Cambodia to assist him in fulfilling his mandate. Three military advisers, from Belgium, France and Malaysia, have accordingly been retained in Cambodia for this purpose, following the departure of the Military Liaison Team.

6. I take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the Governments that contributed personnel to the Military Liaison Team. I also wish to pay tribute to the Chief Military Liaison Officer, the 19 Military Liaison Officers under his command and other staff serving with the Team for the manner in which they carried out their task. Their discipline and dedication were of a high order, reflecting credit on themselves, their countries and the United Nations.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/646
1 June 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Having considered the situation in the Republic of Yemen,

Having regard to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Deeply concerned at the tragic death of innocent civilians,

Appreciating the efforts of the League of Arab States, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the neighbouring States, and other concerned States to contribute to a peaceful resolution of the conflict and to ensure peace and stability in the Republic of Yemen,

Considering that the continuance of the situation could endanger peace and security in the region,

1. Calls for an immediate cease-fire;

2. Urges an immediate cessation of the supply of arms and other matériel which might contribute to the continuation of the conflict;

3. Reminds all concerned that their political differences cannot be resolved through the use of force and urges them to return immediately to negotiations which will permit a peaceful resolution of their differences and a restoration of peace and stability;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to send a fact-finding mission to the area as soon as practicable to assess prospects for a renewed dialogue among all those concerned and for further efforts by them to resolve their differences;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to report to it on the situation at an appropriate time, but not later than one week after the completion of the fact-finding mission;

6. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

94-23659 (E) 010694 02/06/94

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/647
1 June 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH, FRENCH AND SPANISH

LETTER DATED 17 MAY 1994 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF ALL STATES MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS OR MEMBERS OF THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES, CONTAINING A SPECIAL APPEAL FOR VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS FOR THE FINANCING OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS PRIOR TO 16 JUNE 1993

I have the honour to write to you about the financing arrangements for the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).

As you know, prior to 16 June 1993, it was intended that UNFICYP should be financed entirely by voluntary contributions. The funds provided, however, proved insufficient. The General Assembly therefore decided, by resolution 47/236 that, with effect from 16 June 1993, costs of UNFICYP not covered by voluntary contributions should be treated as expenses of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations. In resolution 47/236, the General Assembly also decided to maintain the separate account established prior to 16 June 1993; invited Member States to make voluntary contributions to that account; and requested me to intensify my efforts to seek voluntary contributions towards the costs of the Force.

On 12 November 1993, I therefore addressed a letter to Member States drawing attention to the sums due to troop-contributing Governments in respect of the period when the Force was financed entirely by voluntary contributions, and which remained unpaid. I indicated that on 15 June 1993 the accumulated shortfall in the UNFICYP Special Account was $208.5 million, and that, as a result of the shortfall, the United Nations was not in a position to meet the claims of the troop-contributing countries for the period after December 1981. I therefore invited Governments to give serious consideration to making special voluntary financial contributions to the UNFICYP voluntary account for the period prior to 16 June 1993.

I have to report that, since my approach to Member States, the shortfall in the UNFICYP Special Account in respect of mandate periods prior to 16 June 1993 has not been appreciably reduced. The accumulated shortfall now stands at $194 million. It has therefore been possible only to reimburse claims up to June 1982.

By resolution 48/244, the General Assembly requested me to renew my appeal for voluntary contributions to the UNFICYP Special account established prior to 16 June 1993.

Accordingly, I have the honour to renew my invitation to your Government to give serious consideration to making a special voluntary financial contribution towards the UNFICYP voluntary account.

While any contribution would be greatly appreciated, I should like to propose, again, that those Governments whose current assessment is lower than their previous voluntary contribution towards the financing of UNFICYP should consider contributing the difference towards the outstanding balance due to the troop contributors prior to 16 June 1993.

It is my hope that your Government will find it possible to respond generously to this appeal for a voluntary financial contribution. UNFICYP continues to play a vital role in promoting a peaceful political solution to the problem of Cyprus. By making a voluntary financial contribution, your Government would not only be making an important gesture of appreciation for the dedicated service of the Governments which have contributed to UNFICYP in the past; it would also be helping to resolve a difficult financial situation, which has placed an unfair financial burden on the countries which supported UNFICYP at a time when it was financed entirely by voluntary contributions.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/648
1 June 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 27 MAY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF UGANDA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The Government of Uganda is greatly perturbed by the unending and deranged accusations directed at it by the Government of Rwanda. Rwanda has used its privileged position as representative of the Central African region on the Security Council to distort the truth about the situation in Rwanda and to launch an unwarranted attack on the President and Government of Rwanda.

This Mission has so far replied twice to prior accusations, but the latest ones, contained in document S/1994/586 from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda in his letter to you dated 17 May 1994, have gone too far. I wish to request that you convene an urgent meeting of the Security Council and permit me to make a statement condemning these lies. I also wish to make a comprehensive rebuttal of those accusations in the present correspondence.

Uganda has never committed a single act of aggression against Rwanda. The attack launched on 1 October 1990 against the Government of Rwanda was conducted by the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) without any assistance whatsoever from the Government of Uganda. President Yoweri Museveni condemned the attack, which was carried out by former refugees from Rwanda, some of whom had lived in Uganda for over 30 years, calling it an abuse of the hospitality that the Uganda Government had extended to the refugees for that period. President Museveni, who was also Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) at the time of the attack, had been involved in talks with the Rwandese refugees and the Government of the late President Juvenal Habyarimana aimed at finding means for the return and resettlement of the refugees, but the Rwandese Government had refused to consider any such plan, reasoning that Rwanda was "too small" to accommodate its own people. The refugees finally ran out of patience and hence the attack.

During the period that the Rwandese refugees lived outside their country, they engaged in normal activities similar to those of the population among which they lived. It is a well known fact that Uganda went through a period of civil wars from 1966 to the mid-1980s. The Rwandese refugees in Uganda were part of this war situation and some of them did in fact take up arms and fight alongside Ugandans and it is there that they acquired some military skills and entered the ranks of the Ugandan army. They however remained Rwandese, a part of a diaspora that was denied access to their homeland. They were obviously not satisfied

with their status and continued to engage in dialogue with the Government of Rwanda with the assistance of regional leaders, including President Museveni; however they received no promises or illusions from the Rwandese Government that they would one day be allowed to return to Rwanda. In October 1990, their frustration erupted into a military conflict.

RPF has in fact frequently taken responsibility for stealing Ugandan government equipment, vehicles and arms to launch their first attack. That task was made easier by the fact that some of the refugees who had joined the military during the Ugandan civil wars now had access to the equipment. Anyone without knowledge of the history of Rwanda, as outlined in our earlier letter to you, might be excused for misinterpreting the above facts to read that Uganda was in some way involved. The Ugandan Government, the President in particular, has laboured to explain that history to anyone who cares to pay attention. However, the Government of Rwanda knows the history of its refugees best of all and it is most unscrupulous for it to distort the facts in order to transfer blame for its failings.

Even more unacceptable is the obvious attempt to increase the focus of attention of the international community on the war between its government forces and RPF, whereas the main catastrophe in the Rwandese episode is the killing of the civilian population by trained militias all over the country. The outrage is that the killings are not sporadic and aimless ones, but rather they are a calculated extermination of a minority ethnic group, a genocide that has been unleashed on the people by a tyrannical Government. All the baseless raving by a Government that has lost control of its people and can no longer assert its sovereignty will not erase that cruel fact: the genocide.

Furthermore the Arusha accord has been upheld by many as the basis for settling the Rwanda crisis. In that accord, the Rwandese Government agreed to share power with RPF in Arusha. To turn around now and refer to RPF as Ugandan aggression is not only confusing and misleading, but also shows the deranged nature of these accusations as far as it suggests that the Rwandese Government agreed in Arusha to share power with the Ugandan aggressor! It also implies that the Rwandese Government has returned to its 1987 position when the Central Committee of late Habyarimana's party declared that Rwanda was not responsible for the Rwandese in the diaspora.

United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR)

The United Nations has deployed military observers along the Uganda-Rwanda border for a period of one year and their mandate has recently been renewed for a further six months. That Mission is in fact monitoring the border daily under the command of a neutral United Nations representative.

Prior to that Mission, there were observers from OAU and also from the Government of Rwanda. The monitors were put there for one purpose: to ensure that there was no infiltration of troops or military equipment from the Ugandan side of the border to RPF and thereby allay the suspicions of the Government of Rwanda that Uganda was in some way supporting RPF. To date, not a single report has been made by any of those observers indicating that there was infiltration

through that border. However the Rwandese Government chooses not to believe the reports and continues its desperate accusations. It is very difficult to impress the truth on the Rwandese Government because it believes it would be robbed of its only means of distraction, its only hope of explaining this tragedy with any semblance of reason.

False link between RPF and the Ugandan authorities

RPF does not have headquarters in Kampala, as alleged on page 5 of document S/1994/586, nor does the Ugandan Government have any member of RPF on its payroll. Uganda remains host to thousands of Rwandese refugees and some may be related to officers of RPF but all of them are treated by the Government as they have been for the last three decades.

It is difficult to understand what the authors of the document hoped to achieve by lying about the nationality of Ugandan leaders, including that of the President; but to put the record straight, the President of Uganda and those whose names I recognize in the document are indeed Ugandans. However some names and titles listed, I have never heard of and some of those mentioned are long dead. An update on the structure of the Ugandan Government, including names, is readily available at this Mission.

The link between demobilization of soldiers of the Ugandan Army and RPF is too ridiculous to warrant a detailed explanation. Suffice it to say that the administrative programmes of the Ugandan Army are not dictated by the situation in Rwanda but by that pertaining in Uganda.

Calls by the Rwandese government representatives for an arms embargo on Uganda are therefore calculated messages by dictatorships in our region to render Uganda incapable of defending itself so that the new democratic order in our country is suppressed by arms.

In conclusion, the Ugandan Government condemns very strongly the use of malicious and false propaganda by the Government of Rwanda to discredit Uganda's image in international forums.

I should be grateful if you would circulate this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Perezi K. KAMUNANWIRE
Permanent Representative

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/648*
21 June 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 27 MAY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF UGANDA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The Government of Uganda is greatly perturbed by the unending and deranged accusations directed at it by the Government of Rwanda. Rwanda has used its privileged position as representative of the Central African region on the Security Council to distort the truth about the situation in Rwanda and to launch an unwarranted attack on the President and Government of Uganda.

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* Reissued for technical reasons.

this war situation and some of them did in fact take up arms and fight alongside Ugandans and it is there that they acquired some military skills and entered the ranks of the Ugandan army. They however remained Rwandese, a part of a diaspora that was denied access to their homeland. They were obviously not satisfied with their status and continued to engage in dialogue with the Government of Rwanda with the assistance of regional leaders, including President Museveni; however they received no promises or illusions from the Rwandese Government that they would one day be allowed to return to Rwanda. In October 1990, their frustration erupted into a military conflict.

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Even more unacceptable is the obvious attempt to increase the focus of attention of the international community on the war between its government forces and RPF, whereas the main catastrophe in the Rwandese episode is the killing of the civilian population by trained militias all over the country. The outrage is that the killings are not sporadic and aimless ones, but rather they are a calculated extermination of a minority ethnic group, a genocide that has been unleashed on the people by a tyrannical Government. All the baseless raving by a Government that has lost control of its people and can no longer assert its sovereignty will not erase that cruel fact: the genocide.

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that there was no infiltration of troops or military equipment from the Ugandan side of the border to RPF and thereby allay the suspicions of the Government of Rwanda that Uganda was in some way supporting RPF. To date, not a single report has been made by any of those observers indicating that there was infiltration through that border. However the Rwandese Government chooses not to believe the reports and continues its desperate accusations. It is very difficult to impress the truth on the Rwandese Government because it believes it would be robbed of its only means of distraction, its only hope of explaining this tragedy with any semblance of reason.

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Calls by the Rwandese government representatives for an arms embargo on Uganda are therefore calculated messages by dictatorships in our region to render Uganda incapable of defending itself so that the new democratic order in our country is suppressed by arms.

In conclusion, the Ugandan Government condemns very strongly the use of malicious and false propaganda by the Government of Rwanda to discredit Uganda's image in international forums.

I should be grateful if you would circulate this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Perezi K. KAMUNANWIRE
Permanent Representative

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/649
1 June 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 31 MAY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF TOGO TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a statement which the Togolese Government has deemed it necessary to issue in order to respond to the allegations made in the note from the Ghanaian Government of 25 May 1994 (S/1994/622).

I should be grateful if you would have this text circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Biova-Soumi PENNANEACH
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

94-23641 (E) 020694 020694

020694

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Annex

Statement by the Togolese Government on the relations between Togo and Ghana

On 1 May 1994, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the Togolese Republic, assisted by a colleague, received at his Ministry at Lomé the Chargé d'affaires of Ghana in Togo.

The Minister informed the Chargé d'affaires that the Togolese Government was in possession of information that a certain Logo Dossouvi, a voluntary Togolese refugee living in Ghana, was making preparations, using Togolese youths, to carry out bomb attacks with grenades and bombs in bars, restaurants and nightclubs generally frequented by Europeans.

The Chargé d'affaires was requested to pass on that information to the competent Ghanaian authorities so that they could take measures to prevent Mr. Logo Dossouvi from carrying out such actions.

On 3 May 1994, an explosion occurred at Lomé in the "Le Relaxe" restaurant, injuring six people, of whom five were French and one was Beninese.

Following that bomb attack, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Togo again received the Chargé d'affaires of Ghana to inform him of that incident and lodge a protest about the fact that Togolese political refugees are freely engaging in Ghanaian territory in acts which are not likely to lead to an improvement of relations between the two countries.

This information was communicated to the Ghanaian authorities so as to meet the wish of the Ghanaian and Togolese heads of State to protect the two fraternal countries from acts of destabilization through an exchange of information.

The Togolese Government categorically denies the allegation made in the statement by the Ghanaian Government (S/1994/622) that the Togolese Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation "threatened the anger of France and other foreign Governments against Ghana".

The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Togo could not have known the official position of France so as to be able to report on it to the Chargé d'affaires of Ghana since the latter was received some time before the Chargé d'affaires of France.

The Togolese Government also denies the other allegation that the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Togo said that it was by systematically outwitting the security forces of both Ghana and Togo that the bombs had been smuggled into Togo; that statement was actually made by the Chargé d'affaires of Ghana.

As to the judgement made about Togo in the statement by the Government of Ghana, regarding Togo's alleged "failure to embrace the democratic culture in

all its ramifications", Togo wishes to note that if it needed lessons in democracy, it would definitely not seek them from Ghana.

The Togolese Government wishes to stress that the Ghanaian authorities have never been able to deny that Mr. Logo Dossouvi is living in Ghanaian territory and that his activities are incompatible with his status as refugee.

The Togolese Government reaffirms its constant desire to maintain harmonious relations of cooperation and fraternity with Ghana.